Category Archives: Epistemology

The Problem of Natural Revelation in the Thought of Cornelius Van Til (Andrew Fulford)

Andrew Fulford, Articles, Epistemology, Theology

“The Problem of Natural Revelation in the Thought of Cornelius Van Til” by Andrew Fulford

In recent days we have seen some spirited discussion on the place of natural law and natural theology in the life of the church. One figure who stands out as an important member of the discussion about such matters, at least in Presbyterian circles, is Cornelius Van Til, especially in his essay “Nature And Scripture.” In the course of that essay, Van Til discusses two kinds of “natural theology”: that of the Westminster Confession (which he takes to be identical with scripture’s), and the kind supposedly finding its origin in Greek philosophy. In the following, I will discuss his comments on the first kind, and more particularly, his scriptural argument for his position.

Junius and Van Til on Natural Knowledge of God (Nathan D. Shannon)

Articles, Epistemology, Nathan D. Shannon, Theology

“Junius and Van Til on Natural Knowledge of God” by Nathan D. Shannon

This article compares the views of Franciscus Junius and Cornelius Van Til regarding pre- and post-fall natural knowledge of God. It is argued that while differences are clear, Junius and Van Til both claimed that pre-fall natural theology was not intended to function independently of special revelation. Junius and Van Til also agree that post-fall natural theology, unaided by special revelation, is not theology in any meaningful sense. The conclusion, borrowed from Willem Van Asselt, is that for both Junius and Van Til the determining factor with regard to the structure and status of natural theology is the God-human relationship. This thesis, so far as it is true, enhances the historical credentials of Van Til’s characteristically neo-Calvinist view of natural theology and natural reason.

Christianity and Evidentialism (Nathan D. Shannon)

Apologetics, Articles, Epistemology, Nathan D. Shannon

“Christianity and Evidentialism: Van Til and Locke on Facts and Evidence” by Nathan D. Shannon

Cornelius Van Til’s rejection of brute factuality and his claim that the purported neutrality of evidentialist rationality is in its essence decidedly anti-Christian set the presuppositional apologetic method apart from all others. In this article, I present a study of Van Til’s philosophies of fact and evidence in comparison with the evidentialism of John Locke, arguably the quintessential modern evidentialist. Section 1 is a brief survey of Locke’s epistemology, focusing on the nature of facts and their role in his theories of knowledge and belief. In section 2 we turn to Van Til. Van Til’s argument from predication leads us to the theological underpinnings of his views of fact and evidence. Then in section 3, having Locke’s and Van Til’s views before us, we turn to Van Til’s critique of evidentialism and, specifically, his claim that evidentialism is ultimately committed to creaturely rational autonomy. In this way Locke’s epistemology serves as a test case for the claims Van Til makes against brute factuality and evidentialist rationality.

Some Epistemological Reflections on 1 Cor 2:6-16 (Richard B. Gaffin)

Articles, Epistemology, Richard B. Gaffin, Theology

“Some Epistemological Reflections on 1 Cor 2:6-16” by Richard B. Gaffin

In Jerusalem and Athens G. C. Berkouwer expressed disappointment over Van Til’s criticism of his views. He had expected that “exegesis of Holy Scripture would play a decisive role.” Instead, not only did Van Til misunderstand him, he believed, but “of far greater consequence” was “the total lack of biblical reflection and the absence of a reply to all the exegetical questions.” In a brief response Van Til conceded Berkouwer’s point. His critique of Berkouwer’s theology “should have had much more exegesis in it than it has. This is a defect.” He then went on to generalize, “The lack of detailed scriptural exegesis is a lack in all of my writings. I have no excuse for this.”

 

This interchange highlights a frequent perception (and charge): Van Til talks repeatedly about “the Christ of the Scriptures”; his uncompromising concern is to let “the self-attesting Christ of Scripture” speak. Yet his writings provide precious little, if any, argumentation based on a careful treatment of key biblical passages; his approach is assertive and dogmatizing, rather than exegetical.

God Is His Own Interpreter (Shawn M. Langley)

Dissertations, Epistemology, Shawn M. Langley

“God Is His Own Interpreter: The Theory of Knowledge of Cornelius Van Til in Dialogue with Alvin Plantinga” by Shawn M. Langley

This dissertation develops a comparison of the epistemological formulations of Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga. The theory of knowledge in Van Til has been conspicuously absent from discussions within the Reformed community despite continued interaction with his work. A central contention of this project is that such interaction misconstrues Van Til insofar as it neglects the essential epistemological character of his thought. Initial focus is placed on developing the extent to which Van Til’s theoretical formulations demonstrate a discernible theory of knowledge, and an argument is made for interpreting his epistemology as directly dependent on the conceptual resources of British Idealism. It is shown through Van Til’s appropriation of these resources that an idealist theory of knowledge is indispensable to, but not identifiable with, his distinct epistemological formulations. Attention then shifts to further clarification of Van Til’s theory of knowledge by a juxtaposition with Plantinga’s proper functionalist epistemology. After outlining Plantinga’s discussion on the nature of warrant, both in general and specifically in relation to Christian belief, a number of theoretical characteristics essential to each thinker are brought into dialogue. The first comparison examines the underlying structure of knowledge for both Van Til and Plantinga, demonstrating that Van Til’s formulations neither endorse an idealist coherentism nor exclude Plantinga’s foundationalism. Separate comparisons then consider notions either distinct to or shared by each program, and arguments for the presence of substantive similarity are presented accordingly. Consideration is given lastly to the implications of this comparison for contemporary engagement with Van Til and Plantinga, with particular emphasis being placed on the potential for further dialogue.

Revelational Foundationalism (Steven A. Wilhoit)

Dissertations, Epistemology, Steven A. Wilhoit

“Revelational Foundationalism: A Constructive Synthesis of the Epistemologies of Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga” by Steven A. Wilhoit

Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga are titans in the arena of Christian philosophy. They both come from Dutch Reformed Calvinist traditions and studied under William Jellema at Calvin College. Yet, their approaches to philosophy are distinct, stemming from their different academic and social contexts. Sadly, they never seriously interacted with one another. Currently, a lacuna of scholarship exists integrating both philosophers together. I propose that a constructive synthesis of certain select philosophical and theological ideas of Plantinga and Van Til, as they are taken together and allowed to critically interact, provides a more robust Christian epistemology than either of them can deliver on their own. While some take Van Til to be an internalist, others still see some externalist criteria in his epistemology. Plantinga is explicitly an externalist. Plantinga’s externalism emphasizes how a person acquires knowledge while Van Til’s approach provides the grounds for all rationality, including the very possibility of externalism. Van Til has a deep biblical understanding of the noetic effects of sin. He explains these effects in such a way as to limit the ability of fallen man to understand anything truly, distinguishing knowledge in terms of epistemological and metaphysical. Plantinga affirms the reality of the noetic effects of sin. However, he accounts for the noetic effects as mostly limited to the subject matter of the knowledge of God. Van Til allows no epistemological common ground between unbeliever and believer while Plantinga believes there is vast agreement between the two depending on the subject matter. Van Til argues that the unbeliever relies on borrowed capital from the Christian worldview in order to reason intelligibly while Plantinga ties epistemic progress to properly functioning cognitive faculties. Van Til’s approach to apologetics centers on transcendental arguments and the necessary preconditions for rationality. Plantinga’s approach shows the self-defeating nature of evolutionary naturalism. Given Van Til’s distinction between metaphysically and epistemologically knowing, his understanding of how presuppositions function within one’s worldview, and Plantinga’s understanding of the necessary conditions for knowledge, general revelation is the foundation for metaphysical warranted true belief, and special revelation is the foundation for epistemological warranted true belief.

Quasi-fideist Presuppositionalism (Nicholas Smith)

Apologetics, Articles, Epistemology, Nicholas Smith

“Quasi-fideist Presuppositionalism: Cornelius Van Til, Wittgenstein, and Hinge Epistemology” by Nicholas Smith

I argue that the epistemology underlying Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic methodology is quasi-fideist. According to this view, the rationality of religious belief is dependent on absolutely certain ungrounded grounds, called hinges. I further argue that the quasi-fideist epistemology of presuppositional apologetics explains why Van Til’s method is neither fideist nor problematically circular: hinges are rational in the sense that they are partly constitutive of rationality, and all beliefs (not just religious ones) depend on hinges. In addition, it illuminates something of why it may strike one as a misguided or uncompelling apologetic method: instead of starting by tackling the comparatively minor epistemic commitments of the nonbeliever, it directly approaches their deepest and surest commitments.

Van Til’s Critique of Human Thought (William D. Dennison)

Articles, Epistemology, William D. Dennison

“Van Til’s Critique of Human Thought” by William D. Dennison

Educators have always been concerned about how information is transferred from the teacher to the pupil. Specifically, does the student acquire a sufficient understanding of a subject in order to apply it to life? Over the years, students have voiced this concern with regard to Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987)—they find his language difficult to understand and difficult to apply to apologetic situations.

 

One reason for this is that they are not trained in philosophy. Even so, their failure to comprehend and apply Van Til’s philosophical language has not diminished their enthusiasm for his apologetic starting point, which is the self-attesting Christ of Scripture. For them, the authority of God’s Word and the preeminence of Jesus Christ transcend their own ignorance of philosophy. They know that the apologist is not to compromise the Christ of Scripture with any principle or system of secularization! Even if Van Til’s philosophical language is unclear, his students support his initial commitment to the gospel found in the infallible Word of God.

Epistemology According to Michael Polanyi, Cornelius Van Til, and John Calvin (Charles R. Biggs)

Articles, Charles R. Biggs, Epistemology

“Epistemology According to Michael Polanyi, Cornelius Van Til, and John Calvin” by Charles R. Biggs

Metaphysics asks the question: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” The question that follows leads a person to epistemology: “How do we know there is something rather than nothing; and how do we know that something?” Something is the definition which we make of “what is,” it is the predication of a thing. When we begin to seek out in our universe from our finite starting point, with what kind of presuppositions will we begin in order to get answers and to make sense of it all?

 

Michael Polanyi challenged the methods of science, particularly with regards to the epistemology used in his time. As Francis Schaeffer has said, he completely destroyed the epistemology of Bertrand Russell and Logical Positivism. …

Van Til and Analytic Philosophy (James N. Anderson)

Articles, Epistemology, James N. Anderson, Philosophy

“Van Til and Analytic Philosophy” by James N. Anderson

In honor of the centennial of his birth, the Spring 1995 issue of the Westminster Theological Journal featured a collection of articles on the thought of Cornelius Van Til. One of the articles, by William Dennison, took aim at two critics of Van Til, Cecil and Jesse De Boer, for their reliance on the methodology of analytic philosophy in their critique to Van Til’s epistemology. Dennison also targeted John M. Frame, a fellow ‘disciple’ of Van Til, for his adoption of elements of analytic philosophy in his defense and development of Van Til’s apologetic. In Dennison’s estimation, all three had failed to reckon with a central and distinctive element of Van Til’s thought, namely, the role that his philosophy of history plays in his epistemology. The article also conveyed the clear insinuation that analytic philosophy and Van Tilian philosophy are fundamentally at odds and should be kept at a safe distance. …