Category Archives: Apologetics

The Problem with TAG (Alex Malpass)

Alex Malpass, Apologetics, Articles

“The Problem with TAG” by Alex Malpass

In this article, I will discuss the ‘transcendental argument for the existence of God’ (henceforth ‘TAG’). This forms the backbone of the ‘presuppositional’ approach to Christian apologetics, first formulated by Cornelius Van Til (1895 – 1987). At its simplest, it is a radical defense of the Christian position, which boldly tries to dismiss any counter-argument with the claim that the notion of argument itself presupposes the Christian position. If this were true, then the opponent of Christianity would have to assume the truth of the position they oppose when presenting any argument at all. Instead of the Christian being on the back-foot and trying to respond to the attacks of their opponent (say with archeological evidence or biblical contradictions, etc), TAG is an attempt to switch the weight of the attack back at the non-Christian (who has to justify their ability to present an argument of this nature in the first place). While this is an ingenious way of arguing, it is ultimately flawed, as I will show in this paper.

The Transcendental Perspective of Westminster’s Apologetic (Robert D. Knudsen)

Apologetics, Articles, Robert D. Knudsen

“The Transcendental Perspective of Westminster’s Apologetic” by Robert D. Knudsen

Westminster Theological Seminary has a full-scale department of apologetics. This makes it stand out among major theological seminaries. In most of the main line seminaries apologetics waned in proportion to the growth of liberal theology. In liberal seminaries, apologetics suffered because of theological liberalism’s understanding of the Christian faith, and it finally disappeared.

Theological liberalism focused on spiritual life, as it understood it. Especially in its Ritschlian form, it placed at the center an overwhelming spiritual experience of the, person of Jesus. For the faith of the church, it said, Jesus has the value of God. But both this faith and the Christ it confesses lie beyond the pale of doctrinal formulation. Of itself doctrine was regarded as rigid and dogmatic, an ossified expression of the dynamics of the spirit. Doctrine was given second place, as a symbolic expression of the life found in Jesus Christ. The tactic then was to penetrate beyond doctrinal formulations, with their particularity and rigidity, to the dynamics of the life of spirit. Within this climate of thought, apologetics, as a defense of a doctrinal formulation of Christian faith, was downgraded and finally eliminated. It was replaced by comparative religion, the philosophy of religion, the psychology of religion, and now even by the phenomenology of religion.

For the Sake of Argument (David P. Hoover)

Apologetics, Articles, David P. Hoover

“For the Sake of Argument: A Critique of the Logical Structure of Van Til’s Presuppositionalism” by David P. Hoover

In the essay that follows, one major school of apologetics — Presuppositionalism — is taken up by assessing its logical structure in the writings of its most well-known representative, Cornelius Van Til. The author’s conclusion with regard to Van Til’s presuppositionalism is that the Christian’s apologetic task has been greatly frustrated, in effect, by the replacement of that task with an obscure philosophy about reason-giving.

After identifying the virtual canonical status which the presuppositionalists accord their own position vis-a-vis the evidentialists’ position, the author goes on to test out the Van Tilian apologetic on its own terms. (i) Van Til insists that Christian theism be shown, in some sense, to be necessarily true, but lacks any argument which accomplishes this; (ii) Van Til’s own elucidation of the sort of necessity he is after makes the opposite point probability remains; (iii) the principles which Van Til advocates to get the argument under way logically preclude the only result Van Til will accept; and (iv) Van Til’s resort to “analogical reasoning in order to transcend what would otherwise be a hypothetical conclusion only serves to further obfuscate the presuppositionalist’s position. Analogicity cannot be, nor is it intended to be, a logical property of the argument structure employed by the presuppositionalist. Its function seems to the author to be metaphysical in character. But if so, the presuppositionalist’s argumentation is “saved” from the level of hypothesis only upon pain of conflating, and hence confusing, the categories of logic and metaphysics.

Comparative Apologetic Anatomy (Steve Hays)

Apologetics, Articles, Steve Hays

“Comparative Apologetic Anatomy” by Steve Hays

The ongoing debate over meta-apologetics seems often to have degenerated into a sterile form of genre criticism. ‘Traditional’ apologetics becomes an invidious catch-all category for almost all pre-Van Tilian apologetics and contemporary variations thereof. The San Diego Circle of progressive Van Tilians (led by Frame) has objected that ‘traditional’ apologetics is not all of a kind and not all bad. The Irvine Circle of classic Van Tilians (led by the late Bahnsen) has replied that the differences between traditional varieties are unimportant insofar as they all suffer from the same fatal flaw – being guilty of autonomous reasoning. The San Diego Circle counters that that sweeping indictment is precisely the point at issue since it doesn’t appear that the presuppositional and traditional methods fall so neatly along either side of the autonomous dividing line.

 

The purpose of this ‘Comparative Anatomy of Apologetics,’ is not to level out the differences but to lay out the differences so that we can go behind the simplistic genre criticism and at least identify some of the vital organs and organ-systems which make up a body of apologetics, and so that we can further distinguish one apologetic organism from another. That way the student will be better prepared to render an informed diagnosis as to which organs are viable candidates for transplant – based on degrees of affinity – and which would be rejected due to the incompatibilities involved in trans-species organ sharing. It must also be kept in mind that this is only an introduction to comparative apologetic anatomy, and not a substitute for advanced study. Any classification system will over-simplify the data, classing together certain items based on the application of a particular unifying principle, while applying a different principle would considerably rearrange the distribution patterns.

Is Evidence Really Necessary? (James Grier)

Apologetics, Articles, James Grier

“Is Evidence Really Necessary?” by James Grier

Is it necessary to prove the existence of God in a seemingly atheistic rationalistic society? Must we all preaching and witness first establish the reasonableness and credibility of the faith, and of the Bible in particular? ‘No,’ reply those who subscribe to the so-called ‘presuppositionalism’ proposed by Cornelius Van Til. Here Dr James Grier, formerly Dean of Grand Rapids Baptist Seminary, unravels a debate so central to vital evangelism.

A Primer on Presuppositionalism (Joel Garver)

Apologetics, Articles, Joel Garver, Philosophy

“A Primer on Presuppositionalism” by Joel Garver

“Presuppositionalism” is the name most often given to the variety of Christian apologetics that grows out of the writings of Cornelius van Til. In the following essay we shall consider van Til’s general philosophical outlook and how that gives rise to his basic apologetic stance. Admittedly, his ideas were not as rigorously worked out as well as one might have liked, but I’ll try to fill in the details as I think he would have liked them to be filled in and with some hints from what I take to be some of his better interpreters (e.g., John Frame, Vern Poythress, etc.). Additionally, I shall consider some of the objections to presuppositionalism and attempt to provide a reply.

How Much Intellectual Common Ground Is There Between a Christian and a Non-Christian? (Timothy Paul Jones)

Apologetics, Articles, Timothy Paul Jones

“How Much Intellectual Common Ground Is There Between a Christian and a Non-Christian? Common Notions and Common Ground in the Writings of Cornelius Van Til” by Timothy Paul Jones

The thinking of a Christian and a non-Christian diverges at the most basic level. The believer in Jesus Christ sees all of reality from the cognitive perspective of an individual who lives with “the mind of Christ” and whose life is shaped by the Word of God (1 Corinthians 2:16). This does not cause Christians to become more intelligent, more rational, or more perceptive than non-Christians. A commitment to Jesus Christ does, however, cause every fact in the universe to be seen in a different way, as a reality that exists in, for, and through Christ (Colossians 1:15-20). There is thus a fundamental epistemic distinction between the Christian and the non-Christian. In the words of Reformed theologian Cornelius Van Til, “The natural man has epistemologically nothing in common with the Christian.”

 

But what does this mean for meaningful engagement between Christians and non-Christians, particularly when it comes to ultimate issues such as the truth of Christianity? And what—if any—truths about God can an unbeliever know through nature or natural reason? Most importantly for those of us who live to fulfill the Great Commission—if there is a fundamental epistemic distinction between the thinking of a Christian and a non-Christian—on what basis can a Christian discuss the truth of Jesus with someone who rejects Jesus as he is described in Scripture?

Did Cornelius Van Til Really Teach that Non-Christians Know Nothing? (Timothy Paul Jones)

Apologetics, Articles, Timothy Paul Jones

“Did Cornelius Van Til Really Teach that Non-Christians Know Nothing?” by Timothy Paul Jones

I am not a Van Tilian presuppositionalist, though I am sympathetic with certain aspects of Cornelius Van Til’s approach. Over the past few years, I have—to the best of my knowledge—read every book and syllabus that Van Til wrote related to apologetics.

 

Even after reading several thousand pages of Cornelius Van Til’s writings, I do not find his approach or his assumptions to be wholly convincing. At the same time, I’ve also recognized that there are instances when Van Til’s critics have misconstrued his claims. Admittedly, the critics aren’t the only culprits here! Van Til himself was at least partly to blame. Much of Van Til’s articulation of his own thinking is scattered, unclear, and poorly supported. Still, despite Van Til’s apparent struggle to communicate with clarity, there is much to learn from this Reformed philosopher and theologian. As part of this process of learning, there are some criticisms of Van Til that should be set aside because they misrepresent what Van Til thought and taught.