Category Archives: Apologetics

Christianity and Evidentialism (Nathan D. Shannon)

Apologetics, Articles, Epistemology, Nathan D. Shannon

“Christianity and Evidentialism: Van Til and Locke on Facts and Evidence” by Nathan D. Shannon

Cornelius Van Til’s rejection of brute factuality and his claim that the purported neutrality of evidentialist rationality is in its essence decidedly anti-Christian set the presuppositional apologetic method apart from all others. In this article, I present a study of Van Til’s philosophies of fact and evidence in comparison with the evidentialism of John Locke, arguably the quintessential modern evidentialist. Section 1 is a brief survey of Locke’s epistemology, focusing on the nature of facts and their role in his theories of knowledge and belief. In section 2 we turn to Van Til. Van Til’s argument from predication leads us to the theological underpinnings of his views of fact and evidence. Then in section 3, having Locke’s and Van Til’s views before us, we turn to Van Til’s critique of evidentialism and, specifically, his claim that evidentialism is ultimately committed to creaturely rational autonomy. In this way Locke’s epistemology serves as a test case for the claims Van Til makes against brute factuality and evidentialist rationality.

Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism (Nathaniel Gray Sutanto)

Apologetics, Articles, Nathaniel Gray Sutanto

“Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism: Recalibrating the Argument from Consciousness as a Test Case” by Nathaniel Gray Sutanto

Cornelius Van Til argued that theistic arguments are useful so long as one formulates them “in such a way as not to compromise the doctrines of Scripture.” He rejects, therefore, not the proofs in and of themselves but the foundation on which the proofs are often presented. Van Til thus argued that it is possible to construe the arguments in a manner consistent with Christian theistic principles, on the one hand, or anti-theistic principles, on the other. The former appeals to them in an indirect fashion as confirmatory of the necessary existence of the self-contained triune God while the latter comes in the form of a direct appeal, often yielding the meager result that some god probably exists. Thus many of Van Til’s intellectual descendants have attempted to show how particular theistic proofs might be appropriated into an apologetic dialogue in a manner consistent with the Reformed worldview. I offer, in this paper, then, a Reformed, Covenantal reappropriation of a contemporary popular argument for the existence of God: the argument from consciousness. What is attempted in this essay is thus not originality in substance but in application and expansion.

Reasoning by Presupposition (Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer)

Apologetics, Dissertations, Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer

“Reasoning by Presupposition: Clarifying and Applying the Center of Van Til’s Apologetic” by Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer

This study seeks to analyze and clarify what Van Til meant by the word “presupposition.” Since this concept, and, indeed, the very word, form the heart of Van Til’s distinctive approach to apologetics, elucidating and applying what he meant by both is vital to the discipline of presuppositional apologetics. Consequently, I begin by examining the philosophical background that shaped Van Til’s view of presupposition. From there, in chapter two I provide an in-depth survey of Van Til’s writings, attempting to formulate a definition that captures what Van Til meant by the term. In light of these findings, I contrast Van Til’s understanding of presupposition with his three chief interpreters: Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, and Scott Oliphint. The aim here is to gather the previous analyses of Van Til and his interpreters in order to provide the apologist with a clear and serviceable definition of presupposition to apply to the questions of apologetics.

 

Accordingly, the latter part of the study applies the results of the first two chapters to two different but related problems. In both cases, the relationship between presupposition and transcendental arguments is in focus. More precisely, since presuppositions determine one’s view of transcendental arguments and since Van Til is perhaps best remembered for his famed “transcendental argument for God’s existence,” I have chosen to concentrate on the relationship between the two. First, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its role in formulating transcendental arguments differs from contemporary philosophical understandings of this question. Second, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its relationship to transcendental argument both clarifies and challenges some contemporary Van Tilian understandings of this interrelationship. In conclusion, I sketch, in broad strokes, how the concept of presupposition in Van Til’s writings, as analyzed in the previous chapters, is a primarily theological concept indebted heavily to the thought of Geerhardus Vos, and not a primarily philosophical concept.

The Resurrection of Thomism (Doug Erlandson)

Apologetics, Articles, Doug Erlandson

“The Resurrection of Thomism” by Doug Erlandson

At the heart of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas lies his natural theology. The linchpin of that theology is his Five Ways–his arguments for the existence of God. The presupposition behind all this is the belief that God’s existence can be demonstrated on theologically neutral grounds. If God’s existence cannot be demonstrated, then neither can His attributes. It is no accident that Aquinas’ arguments for God’s existence precede his discussion of God’s attributes. Without the former, his demonstration of the latter would be impossible.

Many twentieth century evangelicals have been attracted to the natural theology of Aquinas, agreeing with him at least in their belief that God’s existence can be demonstrated on theologically neutral grounds. The list includes Stuart C. Hackett, Norman Geisler, R.C. Sproul, J.P. Moreland, and William Lane Craig. In light of the resurgence of the Thomistic arguments and their attractiveness for evangelicals, we must examine afresh its approach to the apologetic task.

Shall We Argue Transcendentally? (Greg Welty)

Apologetics, Articles, Greg Welty

“Shall We Argue Transcendentally? A Perspectival Debate on Apologetic Methodology” by Greg Welty

The purpose of this essay is to give the modern-day Reformed apologist some perspective on this thorny dispute about the appropriate legacy of Van Til for apologetic method. The following pages will seek to defend at length the flexibility in method that Frame has enthusiastically brought to the Van Tillian school of apologetics, showing how Frame applies the principles of common grace and depravity to apologetic method more consistently than Van Til himself. But that flexibility will be defended in a way that remains sympathetic to the core concerns of those who would wish to maintain transcendental argumentation as the exclusive way to honor Christ in the defense of the faith. It will be seen that, despite well-intentioned criticism to the contrary, Frame’s “presuppositionalism of the heart” is the best way to preserve Van Til’s distinctive theological legacy while avoiding Van Til’s mistaken inferences from that theology to the area of methodology.

 

The present thesis proceeds in two steps. First, Van Til’s best arguments for a transcendental approach will be neatly presented, correlated with Frame’s best criticisms against the necessity of that approach. Second, in the aftermath of this hopefully illuminating exchange, an attempt will be made to more precisely articulate the proper relationship between transcendental and traditional arguments in the repertoire of the Reformed apologist.

Quasi-fideist Presuppositionalism (Nicholas Smith)

Apologetics, Articles, Epistemology, Nicholas Smith

“Quasi-fideist Presuppositionalism: Cornelius Van Til, Wittgenstein, and Hinge Epistemology” by Nicholas Smith

I argue that the epistemology underlying Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic methodology is quasi-fideist. According to this view, the rationality of religious belief is dependent on absolutely certain ungrounded grounds, called hinges. I further argue that the quasi-fideist epistemology of presuppositional apologetics explains why Van Til’s method is neither fideist nor problematically circular: hinges are rational in the sense that they are partly constitutive of rationality, and all beliefs (not just religious ones) depend on hinges. In addition, it illuminates something of why it may strike one as a misguided or uncompelling apologetic method: instead of starting by tackling the comparatively minor epistemic commitments of the nonbeliever, it directly approaches their deepest and surest commitments.

False Antithesis: A Critique of the Notion of Antithesis in Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetic (Greg L. Bahnsen)

Apologetics, Articles, Greg L. Bahnsen

“False Antithesis: A Critique of the Notion of Antithesis in Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetic” by Greg L. Bahnsen

Some conceptions of antithesis can unwittingly work to undermine the very antithesis which is essential to the biblical viewpoint. The very idea of apologetics (defending the Christian faith against its cultured despisers) calls for a healthy and sound notion of antithesis, or else apologetics makes no sense. Since belief and unbelief ultimately stand over against each other, they need to challenge each other or call each other to account, as thought the stakes in their dispute were eternal. …

The Influence of Idealism on the Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Timothy I. McConnel)

Apologetics, Articles, Philosophy, Timothy I. McConnel

“The Influence of Idealism on the Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til” by Timothy I. McConnel

Cornelius Van Til completed his doctoral work at Princeton University in 1927 with a dissertation entitled “God and the Absolute,” in which he argued that the God of Christian theism could not be identified with the Absolute of philosophical idealism. A couple of years earlier he had completed his Th.M. at Princeton Theological Seminary, with a thesis entitled “Reformed Epistemology.” In spite of the close proximity and historical relationship of these two institutions, they were clearly distinct, with the seminary then being a much more conservative institution. The philosophy department of Princeton University at that time was under the direction of the British idealist Archibald Allen Bowman. Van Til’s own interest in philosophy, and in particular idealism, had begun during his undergraduate days at Calvin College. There the philosophy department had consisted of only one instructor, W. Harry Jellema, who was himself only a couple of years older than Van Til, and was at the very beginning of his teaching career. Jellema began teaching at Calvin in 1920, while working on his dissertation on Josiah Royce at the University of Michigan, which he completed in 1922. One of the textbooks which he used for the undergraduate courses in philosophy at Calvin was F. H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality, to which Van Til would continue to refer in his later writings on idealist philosophy. …

The Historical Origins of the Presuppositional Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Timothy I. McConnel)

Apologetics, Dissertations, Timothy I. McConnel

“The Historical Origins of the Presuppositional Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til” by Timothy I. McConnel

Cornelius Van Til taught apologetics for one year at Princeton Theological Seminary, and then for the rest of his career at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. He advocated a new approach in apologetics which has come to be known as “presuppositional apologetics.” Presuppositionalism has been controversial within evangelical and Reformed circles, and has been viewed as a radical departure from the Old Princeton evidentialist approach, by both its supporters and detractors. The dissertation argues that Van Til’s presuppositional apologetics is a twentieth century Reformed response to the post-Kantian philosophical focus on epistemology. The first part describes Van Til’s system through an exposition of his major works, and then examines the responses of both his supporters and critics. The second part examines the four major influences that can be discerned within his writings. He frequently referred to Calvin, especially Book I of the Institutes and a treatise on predestination. His doctoral studies were in early twentieth century British idealism. His position was not to accept their answers to philosophical problems, but rather to show that orthodox Christianity provided the answers to the questions they were asking. In many ways, his studies in idealism set the agenda for his apologetics. Van Til’s approach is usually contrasted to the Old Princeton apologetics, but an examination of the apologetics taught by Van Til’s professor at Princeton, William Brenton Greene, Jr., shows a more complex relationship. Disagreements between Van Til and Old Princeton can largely be traced to the latter’s adoption of the Scottish Common Sense Realism, with its non-Calvinist anthropology. Finally, perhaps the most significant influence on Van Til’s apologetics was his Dutch Reformed heritage, especially as mediated by Abraham Kuyper. Presuppositionalism is largely an attempt to work out in apologetics the tension between Kuyper’s notions of common grace and the antithesis. In so doing, Van Til provides a model for Christian engagement with culture. “Common grace” allowed him to appreciate the insights of non-Christian philosophers, while the “antithesis” prevented him from adopting their positions. Rather, he appropriated the wealth of the Calvinist tradition to show that it answered the aspirations of the idealists.

Two Christian Warriors (William Edgar)

Apologetics, Articles, William Edgar

“Two Christian Warriors: Cornelius Van Til and Francis A. Schaeffer Compared” by William Edgar

Cornelius Van Til died in 1987, three years after Francis A. Schaeffer. It is still too early to assess the legacies of these two very different figures in twentieth-century apologetics. Van Til spent most of his professional life teaching at Westminster Seminary. Schaeffer was a pastor, then an evangelist in a community setting. Van Til wrote extensively, tackling subjects related mostly to philosophy and theology. Schaeffer was a speaker first, and a writer only secondarily (although his readership was actually wider than Van Til’s, owing no doubt to his immense popularity in evangelical circles). Though they both had a Reformed background, Van Til affirmed his commitment to the system taught in the Reformed creeds throughout his polemics. Schaeffer did so only tangentially. What can be learned by comparing these two so different people? …