Category Archives: Apologetics
Fernandes on Van Til (Steve Hays)
Comparative Apologetic Anatomy (Steve Hays)
“Comparative Apologetic Anatomy” by Steve Hays
The ongoing debate over meta-apologetics seems often to have degenerated into a sterile form of genre criticism. ‘Traditional’ apologetics becomes an invidious catch-all category for almost all pre-Van Tilian apologetics and contemporary variations thereof. The San Diego Circle of progressive Van Tilians (led by Frame) has objected that ‘traditional’ apologetics is not all of a kind and not all bad. The Irvine Circle of classic Van Tilians (led by the late Bahnsen) has replied that the differences between traditional varieties are unimportant insofar as they all suffer from the same fatal flaw – being guilty of autonomous reasoning. The San Diego Circle counters that that sweeping indictment is precisely the point at issue since it doesn’t appear that the presuppositional and traditional methods fall so neatly along either side of the autonomous dividing line.
The purpose of this ‘Comparative Anatomy of Apologetics,’ is not to level out the differences but to lay out the differences so that we can go behind the simplistic genre criticism and at least identify some of the vital organs and organ-systems which make up a body of apologetics, and so that we can further distinguish one apologetic organism from another. That way the student will be better prepared to render an informed diagnosis as to which organs are viable candidates for transplant – based on degrees of affinity – and which would be rejected due to the incompatibilities involved in trans-species organ sharing. It must also be kept in mind that this is only an introduction to comparative apologetic anatomy, and not a substitute for advanced study. Any classification system will over-simplify the data, classing together certain items based on the application of a particular unifying principle, while applying a different principle would considerably rearrange the distribution patterns.
Is Evidence Really Necessary? (James Grier)
“Is Evidence Really Necessary?” by James Grier
Is it necessary to prove the existence of God in a seemingly atheistic rationalistic society? Must we all preaching and witness first establish the reasonableness and credibility of the faith, and of the Bible in particular? ‘No,’ reply those who subscribe to the so-called ‘presuppositionalism’ proposed by Cornelius Van Til. Here Dr James Grier, formerly Dean of Grand Rapids Baptist Seminary, unravels a debate so central to vital evangelism.
A Primer on Presuppositionalism (Joel Garver)
“A Primer on Presuppositionalism” by Joel Garver
“Presuppositionalism” is the name most often given to the variety of Christian apologetics that grows out of the writings of Cornelius van Til. In the following essay we shall consider van Til’s general philosophical outlook and how that gives rise to his basic apologetic stance. Admittedly, his ideas were not as rigorously worked out as well as one might have liked, but I’ll try to fill in the details as I think he would have liked them to be filled in and with some hints from what I take to be some of his better interpreters (e.g., John Frame, Vern Poythress, etc.). Additionally, I shall consider some of the objections to presuppositionalism and attempt to provide a reply.
How Much Intellectual Common Ground Is There Between a Christian and a Non-Christian? (Timothy Paul Jones)
“How Much Intellectual Common Ground Is There Between a Christian and a Non-Christian? Common Notions and Common Ground in the Writings of Cornelius Van Til” by Timothy Paul Jones
The thinking of a Christian and a non-Christian diverges at the most basic level. The believer in Jesus Christ sees all of reality from the cognitive perspective of an individual who lives with “the mind of Christ” and whose life is shaped by the Word of God (1 Corinthians 2:16). This does not cause Christians to become more intelligent, more rational, or more perceptive than non-Christians. A commitment to Jesus Christ does, however, cause every fact in the universe to be seen in a different way, as a reality that exists in, for, and through Christ (Colossians 1:15-20). There is thus a fundamental epistemic distinction between the Christian and the non-Christian. In the words of Reformed theologian Cornelius Van Til, “The natural man has epistemologically nothing in common with the Christian.”
But what does this mean for meaningful engagement between Christians and non-Christians, particularly when it comes to ultimate issues such as the truth of Christianity? And what—if any—truths about God can an unbeliever know through nature or natural reason? Most importantly for those of us who live to fulfill the Great Commission—if there is a fundamental epistemic distinction between the thinking of a Christian and a non-Christian—on what basis can a Christian discuss the truth of Jesus with someone who rejects Jesus as he is described in Scripture?
Did Cornelius Van Til Really Teach that Non-Christians Know Nothing? (Timothy Paul Jones)
“Did Cornelius Van Til Really Teach that Non-Christians Know Nothing?” by Timothy Paul Jones
I am not a Van Tilian presuppositionalist, though I am sympathetic with certain aspects of Cornelius Van Til’s approach. Over the past few years, I have—to the best of my knowledge—read every book and syllabus that Van Til wrote related to apologetics.
Even after reading several thousand pages of Cornelius Van Til’s writings, I do not find his approach or his assumptions to be wholly convincing. At the same time, I’ve also recognized that there are instances when Van Til’s critics have misconstrued his claims. Admittedly, the critics aren’t the only culprits here! Van Til himself was at least partly to blame. Much of Van Til’s articulation of his own thinking is scattered, unclear, and poorly supported. Still, despite Van Til’s apparent struggle to communicate with clarity, there is much to learn from this Reformed philosopher and theologian. As part of this process of learning, there are some criticisms of Van Til that should be set aside because they misrepresent what Van Til thought and taught.
Christianity and Evidentialism (Nathan D. Shannon)
“Christianity and Evidentialism: Van Til and Locke on Facts and Evidence” by Nathan D. Shannon
Cornelius Van Til’s rejection of brute factuality and his claim that the purported neutrality of evidentialist rationality is in its essence decidedly anti-Christian set the presuppositional apologetic method apart from all others. In this article, I present a study of Van Til’s philosophies of fact and evidence in comparison with the evidentialism of John Locke, arguably the quintessential modern evidentialist. Section 1 is a brief survey of Locke’s epistemology, focusing on the nature of facts and their role in his theories of knowledge and belief. In section 2 we turn to Van Til. Van Til’s argument from predication leads us to the theological underpinnings of his views of fact and evidence. Then in section 3, having Locke’s and Van Til’s views before us, we turn to Van Til’s critique of evidentialism and, specifically, his claim that evidentialism is ultimately committed to creaturely rational autonomy. In this way Locke’s epistemology serves as a test case for the claims Van Til makes against brute factuality and evidentialist rationality.
Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism (Nathaniel Gray Sutanto)
“Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism: Recalibrating the Argument from Consciousness as a Test Case” by Nathaniel Gray Sutanto
Cornelius Van Til argued that theistic arguments are useful so long as one formulates them “in such a way as not to compromise the doctrines of Scripture.” He rejects, therefore, not the proofs in and of themselves but the foundation on which the proofs are often presented. Van Til thus argued that it is possible to construe the arguments in a manner consistent with Christian theistic principles, on the one hand, or anti-theistic principles, on the other. The former appeals to them in an indirect fashion as confirmatory of the necessary existence of the self-contained triune God while the latter comes in the form of a direct appeal, often yielding the meager result that some god probably exists. Thus many of Van Til’s intellectual descendants have attempted to show how particular theistic proofs might be appropriated into an apologetic dialogue in a manner consistent with the Reformed worldview. I offer, in this paper, then, a Reformed, Covenantal reappropriation of a contemporary popular argument for the existence of God: the argument from consciousness. What is attempted in this essay is thus not originality in substance but in application and expansion.
Reasoning by Presupposition (Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer)
“Reasoning by Presupposition: Clarifying and Applying the Center of Van Til’s Apologetic” by Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer
This study seeks to analyze and clarify what Van Til meant by the word “presupposition.” Since this concept, and, indeed, the very word, form the heart of Van Til’s distinctive approach to apologetics, elucidating and applying what he meant by both is vital to the discipline of presuppositional apologetics. Consequently, I begin by examining the philosophical background that shaped Van Til’s view of presupposition. From there, in chapter two I provide an in-depth survey of Van Til’s writings, attempting to formulate a definition that captures what Van Til meant by the term. In light of these findings, I contrast Van Til’s understanding of presupposition with his three chief interpreters: Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, and Scott Oliphint. The aim here is to gather the previous analyses of Van Til and his interpreters in order to provide the apologist with a clear and serviceable definition of presupposition to apply to the questions of apologetics.
Accordingly, the latter part of the study applies the results of the first two chapters to two different but related problems. In both cases, the relationship between presupposition and transcendental arguments is in focus. More precisely, since presuppositions determine one’s view of transcendental arguments and since Van Til is perhaps best remembered for his famed “transcendental argument for God’s existence,” I have chosen to concentrate on the relationship between the two. First, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its role in formulating transcendental arguments differs from contemporary philosophical understandings of this question. Second, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its relationship to transcendental argument both clarifies and challenges some contemporary Van Tilian understandings of this interrelationship. In conclusion, I sketch, in broad strokes, how the concept of presupposition in Van Til’s writings, as analyzed in the previous chapters, is a primarily theological concept indebted heavily to the thought of Geerhardus Vos, and not a primarily philosophical concept.