Category Archives: Dissertations

The Triune Personal God (Lane G. Tipton)

“The Triune Personal God: Trinitarian Theology in the Thought of Cornelius Van Til” by Lane G. Tipton

This study investigates the function of the Trinity in Cornelius Van Til’s theology and apologetics and suggests an exegetical strategy for enriching and developing his foundational insights. The thesis is that God as absolute triune personality supplies in Van Til’s system of thought the fundamental theological structure for both the content and defense of the Reformed faith. Locating Van Til’s historical context in his theological and philosophical interaction with the Boston Personalists, who affirmed personality only of God’s unity, and Gordon Clark, who affirmed personality only of God’s diversity, this study will explore the theological rationale for Van Til’s formulation that God is absolute personality, which can be expressed in the language that the triune God is one person and three persons, or one-conscious and three-conscious.

 

God Is His Own Interpreter (Shawn M. Langley)

“God Is His Own Interpreter: The Theory of Knowledge of Cornelius Van Til in Dialogue with Alvin Plantinga” by Shawn M. Langley

This dissertation develops a comparison of the epistemological formulations of Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga. The theory of knowledge in Van Til has been conspicuously absent from discussions within the Reformed community despite continued interaction with his work. A central contention of this project is that such interaction misconstrues Van Til insofar as it neglects the essential epistemological character of his thought. Initial focus is placed on developing the extent to which Van Til’s theoretical formulations demonstrate a discernible theory of knowledge, and an argument is made for interpreting his epistemology as directly dependent on the conceptual resources of British Idealism. It is shown through Van Til’s appropriation of these resources that an idealist theory of knowledge is indispensable to, but not identifiable with, his distinct epistemological formulations. Attention then shifts to further clarification of Van Til’s theory of knowledge by a juxtaposition with Plantinga’s proper functionalist epistemology. After outlining Plantinga’s discussion on the nature of warrant, both in general and specifically in relation to Christian belief, a number of theoretical characteristics essential to each thinker are brought into dialogue. The first comparison examines the underlying structure of knowledge for both Van Til and Plantinga, demonstrating that Van Til’s formulations neither endorse an idealist coherentism nor exclude Plantinga’s foundationalism. Separate comparisons then consider notions either distinct to or shared by each program, and arguments for the presence of substantive similarity are presented accordingly. Consideration is given lastly to the implications of this comparison for contemporary engagement with Van Til and Plantinga, with particular emphasis being placed on the potential for further dialogue.

Reasoning by Presupposition (Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer)

“Reasoning by Presupposition: Clarifying and Applying the Center of Van Til’s Apologetic” by Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer

This study seeks to analyze and clarify what Van Til meant by the word “presupposition.” Since this concept, and, indeed, the very word, form the heart of Van Til’s distinctive approach to apologetics, elucidating and applying what he meant by both is vital to the discipline of presuppositional apologetics. Consequently, I begin by examining the philosophical background that shaped Van Til’s view of presupposition. From there, in chapter two I provide an in-depth survey of Van Til’s writings, attempting to formulate a definition that captures what Van Til meant by the term. In light of these findings, I contrast Van Til’s understanding of presupposition with his three chief interpreters: Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, and Scott Oliphint. The aim here is to gather the previous analyses of Van Til and his interpreters in order to provide the apologist with a clear and serviceable definition of presupposition to apply to the questions of apologetics.

 

Accordingly, the latter part of the study applies the results of the first two chapters to two different but related problems. In both cases, the relationship between presupposition and transcendental arguments is in focus. More precisely, since presuppositions determine one’s view of transcendental arguments and since Van Til is perhaps best remembered for his famed “transcendental argument for God’s existence,” I have chosen to concentrate on the relationship between the two. First, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its role in formulating transcendental arguments differs from contemporary philosophical understandings of this question. Second, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its relationship to transcendental argument both clarifies and challenges some contemporary Van Tilian understandings of this interrelationship. In conclusion, I sketch, in broad strokes, how the concept of presupposition in Van Til’s writings, as analyzed in the previous chapters, is a primarily theological concept indebted heavily to the thought of Geerhardus Vos, and not a primarily philosophical concept.

Revelational Foundationalism (Steven A. Wilhoit)

“Revelational Foundationalism: A Constructive Synthesis of the Epistemologies of Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga” by Steven A. Wilhoit

Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga are titans in the arena of Christian philosophy. They both come from Dutch Reformed Calvinist traditions and studied under William Jellema at Calvin College. Yet, their approaches to philosophy are distinct, stemming from their different academic and social contexts. Sadly, they never seriously interacted with one another. Currently, a lacuna of scholarship exists integrating both philosophers together. I propose that a constructive synthesis of certain select philosophical and theological ideas of Plantinga and Van Til, as they are taken together and allowed to critically interact, provides a more robust Christian epistemology than either of them can deliver on their own. While some take Van Til to be an internalist, others still see some externalist criteria in his epistemology. Plantinga is explicitly an externalist. Plantinga’s externalism emphasizes how a person acquires knowledge while Van Til’s approach provides the grounds for all rationality, including the very possibility of externalism. Van Til has a deep biblical understanding of the noetic effects of sin. He explains these effects in such a way as to limit the ability of fallen man to understand anything truly, distinguishing knowledge in terms of epistemological and metaphysical. Plantinga affirms the reality of the noetic effects of sin. However, he accounts for the noetic effects as mostly limited to the subject matter of the knowledge of God. Van Til allows no epistemological common ground between unbeliever and believer while Plantinga believes there is vast agreement between the two depending on the subject matter. Van Til argues that the unbeliever relies on borrowed capital from the Christian worldview in order to reason intelligibly while Plantinga ties epistemic progress to properly functioning cognitive faculties. Van Til’s approach to apologetics centers on transcendental arguments and the necessary preconditions for rationality. Plantinga’s approach shows the self-defeating nature of evolutionary naturalism. Given Van Til’s distinction between metaphysically and epistemologically knowing, his understanding of how presuppositions function within one’s worldview, and Plantinga’s understanding of the necessary conditions for knowledge, general revelation is the foundation for metaphysical warranted true belief, and special revelation is the foundation for epistemological warranted true belief.

The Historical Origins of the Presuppositional Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Timothy I. McConnel)

“The Historical Origins of the Presuppositional Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til” by Timothy I. McConnel

Cornelius Van Til taught apologetics for one year at Princeton Theological Seminary, and then for the rest of his career at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. He advocated a new approach in apologetics which has come to be known as “presuppositional apologetics.” Presuppositionalism has been controversial within evangelical and Reformed circles, and has been viewed as a radical departure from the Old Princeton evidentialist approach, by both its supporters and detractors. The dissertation argues that Van Til’s presuppositional apologetics is a twentieth century Reformed response to the post-Kantian philosophical focus on epistemology. The first part describes Van Til’s system through an exposition of his major works, and then examines the responses of both his supporters and critics. The second part examines the four major influences that can be discerned within his writings. He frequently referred to Calvin, especially Book I of the Institutes and a treatise on predestination. His doctoral studies were in early twentieth century British idealism. His position was not to accept their answers to philosophical problems, but rather to show that orthodox Christianity provided the answers to the questions they were asking. In many ways, his studies in idealism set the agenda for his apologetics. Van Til’s approach is usually contrasted to the Old Princeton apologetics, but an examination of the apologetics taught by Van Til’s professor at Princeton, William Brenton Greene, Jr., shows a more complex relationship. Disagreements between Van Til and Old Princeton can largely be traced to the latter’s adoption of the Scottish Common Sense Realism, with its non-Calvinist anthropology. Finally, perhaps the most significant influence on Van Til’s apologetics was his Dutch Reformed heritage, especially as mediated by Abraham Kuyper. Presuppositionalism is largely an attempt to work out in apologetics the tension between Kuyper’s notions of common grace and the antithesis. In so doing, Van Til provides a model for Christian engagement with culture. “Common grace” allowed him to appreciate the insights of non-Christian philosophers, while the “antithesis” prevented him from adopting their positions. Rather, he appropriated the wealth of the Calvinist tradition to show that it answered the aspirations of the idealists.