All posts by James

Some Epistemological Reflections on 1 Cor 2:6-16 (Richard B. Gaffin)

“Some Epistemological Reflections on 1 Cor 2:6-16” by Richard B. Gaffin

In Jerusalem and Athens G. C. Berkouwer expressed disappointment over Van Til’s criticism of his views. He had expected that “exegesis of Holy Scripture would play a decisive role.” Instead, not only did Van Til misunderstand him, he believed, but “of far greater consequence” was “the total lack of biblical reflection and the absence of a reply to all the exegetical questions.” In a brief response Van Til conceded Berkouwer’s point. His critique of Berkouwer’s theology “should have had much more exegesis in it than it has. This is a defect.” He then went on to generalize, “The lack of detailed scriptural exegesis is a lack in all of my writings. I have no excuse for this.”

 

This interchange highlights a frequent perception (and charge): Van Til talks repeatedly about “the Christ of the Scriptures”; his uncompromising concern is to let “the self-attesting Christ of Scripture” speak. Yet his writings provide precious little, if any, argumentation based on a careful treatment of key biblical passages; his approach is assertive and dogmatizing, rather than exegetical.

God Is His Own Interpreter (Shawn M. Langley)

“God Is His Own Interpreter: The Theory of Knowledge of Cornelius Van Til in Dialogue with Alvin Plantinga” by Shawn M. Langley

This dissertation develops a comparison of the epistemological formulations of Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga. The theory of knowledge in Van Til has been conspicuously absent from discussions within the Reformed community despite continued interaction with his work. A central contention of this project is that such interaction misconstrues Van Til insofar as it neglects the essential epistemological character of his thought. Initial focus is placed on developing the extent to which Van Til’s theoretical formulations demonstrate a discernible theory of knowledge, and an argument is made for interpreting his epistemology as directly dependent on the conceptual resources of British Idealism. It is shown through Van Til’s appropriation of these resources that an idealist theory of knowledge is indispensable to, but not identifiable with, his distinct epistemological formulations. Attention then shifts to further clarification of Van Til’s theory of knowledge by a juxtaposition with Plantinga’s proper functionalist epistemology. After outlining Plantinga’s discussion on the nature of warrant, both in general and specifically in relation to Christian belief, a number of theoretical characteristics essential to each thinker are brought into dialogue. The first comparison examines the underlying structure of knowledge for both Van Til and Plantinga, demonstrating that Van Til’s formulations neither endorse an idealist coherentism nor exclude Plantinga’s foundationalism. Separate comparisons then consider notions either distinct to or shared by each program, and arguments for the presence of substantive similarity are presented accordingly. Consideration is given lastly to the implications of this comparison for contemporary engagement with Van Til and Plantinga, with particular emphasis being placed on the potential for further dialogue.

Reasoning by Presupposition (Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer)

“Reasoning by Presupposition: Clarifying and Applying the Center of Van Til’s Apologetic” by Gabriel N. E. Fluhrer

This study seeks to analyze and clarify what Van Til meant by the word “presupposition.” Since this concept, and, indeed, the very word, form the heart of Van Til’s distinctive approach to apologetics, elucidating and applying what he meant by both is vital to the discipline of presuppositional apologetics. Consequently, I begin by examining the philosophical background that shaped Van Til’s view of presupposition. From there, in chapter two I provide an in-depth survey of Van Til’s writings, attempting to formulate a definition that captures what Van Til meant by the term. In light of these findings, I contrast Van Til’s understanding of presupposition with his three chief interpreters: Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, and Scott Oliphint. The aim here is to gather the previous analyses of Van Til and his interpreters in order to provide the apologist with a clear and serviceable definition of presupposition to apply to the questions of apologetics.

 

Accordingly, the latter part of the study applies the results of the first two chapters to two different but related problems. In both cases, the relationship between presupposition and transcendental arguments is in focus. More precisely, since presuppositions determine one’s view of transcendental arguments and since Van Til is perhaps best remembered for his famed “transcendental argument for God’s existence,” I have chosen to concentrate on the relationship between the two. First, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its role in formulating transcendental arguments differs from contemporary philosophical understandings of this question. Second, I examine how Van Til’s understanding of presupposition and its relationship to transcendental argument both clarifies and challenges some contemporary Van Tilian understandings of this interrelationship. In conclusion, I sketch, in broad strokes, how the concept of presupposition in Van Til’s writings, as analyzed in the previous chapters, is a primarily theological concept indebted heavily to the thought of Geerhardus Vos, and not a primarily philosophical concept.

The Resurrection of Thomism (Doug Erlandson)

“The Resurrection of Thomism” by Doug Erlandson

At the heart of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas lies his natural theology. The linchpin of that theology is his Five Ways–his arguments for the existence of God. The presupposition behind all this is the belief that God’s existence can be demonstrated on theologically neutral grounds. If God’s existence cannot be demonstrated, then neither can His attributes. It is no accident that Aquinas’ arguments for God’s existence precede his discussion of God’s attributes. Without the former, his demonstration of the latter would be impossible.

Many twentieth century evangelicals have been attracted to the natural theology of Aquinas, agreeing with him at least in their belief that God’s existence can be demonstrated on theologically neutral grounds. The list includes Stuart C. Hackett, Norman Geisler, R.C. Sproul, J.P. Moreland, and William Lane Craig. In light of the resurgence of the Thomistic arguments and their attractiveness for evangelicals, we must examine afresh its approach to the apologetic task.

Shall We Argue Transcendentally? (Greg Welty)

“Shall We Argue Transcendentally? A Perspectival Debate on Apologetic Methodology” by Greg Welty

The purpose of this essay is to give the modern-day Reformed apologist some perspective on this thorny dispute about the appropriate legacy of Van Til for apologetic method. The following pages will seek to defend at length the flexibility in method that Frame has enthusiastically brought to the Van Tillian school of apologetics, showing how Frame applies the principles of common grace and depravity to apologetic method more consistently than Van Til himself. But that flexibility will be defended in a way that remains sympathetic to the core concerns of those who would wish to maintain transcendental argumentation as the exclusive way to honor Christ in the defense of the faith. It will be seen that, despite well-intentioned criticism to the contrary, Frame’s “presuppositionalism of the heart” is the best way to preserve Van Til’s distinctive theological legacy while avoiding Van Til’s mistaken inferences from that theology to the area of methodology.

 

The present thesis proceeds in two steps. First, Van Til’s best arguments for a transcendental approach will be neatly presented, correlated with Frame’s best criticisms against the necessity of that approach. Second, in the aftermath of this hopefully illuminating exchange, an attempt will be made to more precisely articulate the proper relationship between transcendental and traditional arguments in the repertoire of the Reformed apologist.

Van Til’s Trinitarian Theology (Lane G. Tipton)

“Van Til’s Trinitarian Theology” by Lane G. Tipton

Lane G. Tipton joins the panel again to discuss Cornelius Van Til’s particular formulation of Trinitarian theology. Dr. Tipton is Associate Professor of Systematic Theology at Westminster Theological Seminary (PA) and has written a dissertation on the topic. Join us as we talk about Dr. Van Til’s theology and the importance of his Trinitarian theology not only for understanding his apologetic system but for holding all things together.

The Trinitarian Theology of Cornelius Van Til (Lane G. Tipton)

The Trinitarian Theology of Cornelius Van Til by Lane G. Tipton

Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987) offered a confessionally Reformed doctrine of the Creator-creature relation that stands out as distinct in contrast to both traditional Roman Catholic and contemporary Barthian alternatives. His Trinitarian theology of the Creator-creature relation supplied a pioneering enrichment of Reformed theology in the traditions of Old Princeton and Old Amsterdam.

 

In this volume, Lane G. Tipton interprets Van Til in his own historical and polemical context and demonstrates how the immutably dynamic life of the self-contained Trinity bears upon God’s relation to Adam in the work of creation, the act of special providence in covenant, and the person and eternal Son in the event of incarnation.

 

Tipton argues that Van Til’s Trinitarian theology deepens confessionally Reformed Trinitarianism and federalism in contrast to medieval Thomistic and modern Barthian theological alternatives. In a period marked by theological decline, he strives to clarify and extend confessional Reformed Trinitarian and federal theology in the service of the church’s union and communion with the immutable person of the crucified and ascended Christ of Scripture.

Revelational Foundationalism (Steven A. Wilhoit)

“Revelational Foundationalism: A Constructive Synthesis of the Epistemologies of Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga” by Steven A. Wilhoit

Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga are titans in the arena of Christian philosophy. They both come from Dutch Reformed Calvinist traditions and studied under William Jellema at Calvin College. Yet, their approaches to philosophy are distinct, stemming from their different academic and social contexts. Sadly, they never seriously interacted with one another. Currently, a lacuna of scholarship exists integrating both philosophers together. I propose that a constructive synthesis of certain select philosophical and theological ideas of Plantinga and Van Til, as they are taken together and allowed to critically interact, provides a more robust Christian epistemology than either of them can deliver on their own. While some take Van Til to be an internalist, others still see some externalist criteria in his epistemology. Plantinga is explicitly an externalist. Plantinga’s externalism emphasizes how a person acquires knowledge while Van Til’s approach provides the grounds for all rationality, including the very possibility of externalism. Van Til has a deep biblical understanding of the noetic effects of sin. He explains these effects in such a way as to limit the ability of fallen man to understand anything truly, distinguishing knowledge in terms of epistemological and metaphysical. Plantinga affirms the reality of the noetic effects of sin. However, he accounts for the noetic effects as mostly limited to the subject matter of the knowledge of God. Van Til allows no epistemological common ground between unbeliever and believer while Plantinga believes there is vast agreement between the two depending on the subject matter. Van Til argues that the unbeliever relies on borrowed capital from the Christian worldview in order to reason intelligibly while Plantinga ties epistemic progress to properly functioning cognitive faculties. Van Til’s approach to apologetics centers on transcendental arguments and the necessary preconditions for rationality. Plantinga’s approach shows the self-defeating nature of evolutionary naturalism. Given Van Til’s distinction between metaphysically and epistemologically knowing, his understanding of how presuppositions function within one’s worldview, and Plantinga’s understanding of the necessary conditions for knowledge, general revelation is the foundation for metaphysical warranted true belief, and special revelation is the foundation for epistemological warranted true belief.

Quasi-fideist Presuppositionalism (Nicholas Smith)

“Quasi-fideist Presuppositionalism: Cornelius Van Til, Wittgenstein, and Hinge Epistemology” by Nicholas Smith

I argue that the epistemology underlying Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic methodology is quasi-fideist. According to this view, the rationality of religious belief is dependent on absolutely certain ungrounded grounds, called hinges. I further argue that the quasi-fideist epistemology of presuppositional apologetics explains why Van Til’s method is neither fideist nor problematically circular: hinges are rational in the sense that they are partly constitutive of rationality, and all beliefs (not just religious ones) depend on hinges. In addition, it illuminates something of why it may strike one as a misguided or uncompelling apologetic method: instead of starting by tackling the comparatively minor epistemic commitments of the nonbeliever, it directly approaches their deepest and surest commitments.

False Antithesis: A Critique of the Notion of Antithesis in Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetic (Greg L. Bahnsen)

“False Antithesis: A Critique of the Notion of Antithesis in Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetic” by Greg L. Bahnsen

Some conceptions of antithesis can unwittingly work to undermine the very antithesis which is essential to the biblical viewpoint. The very idea of apologetics (defending the Christian faith against its cultured despisers) calls for a healthy and sound notion of antithesis, or else apologetics makes no sense. Since belief and unbelief ultimately stand over against each other, they need to challenge each other or call each other to account, as thought the stakes in their dispute were eternal. …