Category Archives: Epistemology

The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception in Presuppositional Apologetics (Greg L. Bahnsen)

“The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception in Presuppositional Apologetics” by Greg L. Bahnsen

That self-deception which is practiced by all unregenerate men according to the Apostle Paul’s incisive description in Romans 1:18ff. is at once religiously momentous and yet philosophically enigmatic. It is also one of the focal points in continuing criticism of Cornelius Van Til’s apologetic and, as such, invites analysis with a view to supplementing and strengthening the saintly professor’s remarkable contribution to the history of apologetics. …

Van Til’s Challenge to Illegitimate Common Ground (Greg L. Bahnsen)

“Van Til’s Challenge to Illegitimate Common Ground” by Greg L. Bahnsen

The last two issues of Penpoint have featured essays on the apologetic of Dr. Cornelius Van Til, as does this one, because 1995 is the centennial of his birth, and one of our key objectives at SCCCS has been to honor, preserve, and advance Van Til’s distinctive and reformational defense of the Christian faith. [FOOTNOTE: See my article “Socrates or Christ: The Reformation of Christian Apologetics” in Foundations of Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, ed. Gary North (Vallecito, CA: Ross House, 1976), pp. 191-239 (available from CTM).] It is worth preserving. …

Van Til’s Presuppositionalism (Greg L. Bahnsen)

“Van Til’s Presuppositionalism” by Greg L. Bahnsen

1995 celebrates the centennial of the birth of Cornelius Van Til, the most profound writer in apologetics in the twentieth century. His distinctive method was called the “presuppositional” defense of the faith, which is explained in this excerpt from Dr. Bahnsen’s upcoming book on Van Til’s apologetic, including readings and analysis. …

Pragmatism, Prejudice, and Presuppositionalism (Greg L. Bahnsen)

“Pragmatism, Prejudice, and Presuppositionalism” by Greg L. Bahnsen

This essay cannot attempt to do justice to the multiple avenues traversed by twentieth-century philosophers; they constitute a maze of both overlapping and divergent lines of thought: idealism, realism, phenomenology, process philosophy, existentialism, positivism, pragmatism, and linguisticanalysis. Each has a claim on the Christian scholar’s attention. However, we must narrow the field. It  is reasonably accurate to distinguish the emphasis on phenomenology and existentialism on the Continent from the dominance of pragmatism and analysis in England and America. Since the present study is being done in the context of Anglo-American scholarship, we shall focus our attention on the schools of pragmatism and linguistic analysis-all the while recognizing the affinities which can be seen between them and aspects of European thought. Three prominent philosophers in these traditions who have had distinctive proposals in the theory of knowledge are John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and John L. Austin; as will be later exhibited; common elements in their approaches bind them together in various ways. …

Van Til on Antithesis (John M. Frame)

“Van Til on Antithesis” by John M. Frame

As we seek to make the best use of Cornelius Van Til’s thought in our own time, it is especially important that we come to grips with his concept of antithesis, the diametrical opposition between belief and unbelief and therefore between belief and any compromise of revealed truth. The concept of antithesis is one of Van Til’s own major concerns, and it is that element in his thought which has brought him the most severe criticism. In the present pluralistic theological climate, it seems particularly difficult to draw lines sharply enough to support Van Tilian talk of antithesis: lines between denominational traditions, between liberal and conservative, between Christianity and other religions, between belief and unbelief. Universalism is taken for granted in contemporary liberal theology, and conservative Christian thinkers, if not going that far, often tend nevertheless to play down the differences between themselves and others. Is it possible, even necessary, to maintain Van Til’s emphasis in our time and to repudiate all these tendencies toward accommodation? Or did Van Til overstate his case, unnecessarily inhibiting biblical ecumenism? Or is the truth to be found somewhere between these two evaluations? …

Transcendental Arguments (John M. Frame)

“Transcendental Arguments” by John M. Frame

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is responsible for introducing the term “transcendental” to philosophical discussion. Seeking to repel the skepticism of David Hume, but unable to accept the methods of his rationalist teacher Christian Wolff, Kant came to advocate transcendental argument as a new means of grounding the certainty of mathematics, science, and philosophy.

 

All of us, he argued, must concede that knowledge is possible. Else there is no point to any discussion or inquiry. Now, given that knowledge is possible, said Kant, we should ask what the conditions are that make knowledge possible. What must the world be like, and what must the workings of our minds be like, if human knowledge is to be possible? …

My Credo (Cornelius Van Til)

“My Credo” by Cornelius Van Til

How can I express my appreciation adequately for the honor you have conferred on me by your contributions to this Festschrift? I shall try to do so first by setting forth in this, my “Credo,” a general statement of my main beliefs as I hold them today. Then I shall deal separately with the problems and objections some of you have raised in respect to my views in separate response to the essays themselves. I hope that by doing this we may be of help to one another as together we present the name of Jesus as the only name given under heaven by which men must be saved. …